Shuichiro HARUTA †a) , Hiromu ASAHINA †b) , Student Members, Fumitaka YAMAZAKI †c) , Nonmember, and Iwao SASASE †d) , Fellow SUMMARY Detecting phishing websites is imperative. Among several detection schemes, the promising ones are the visual similarity-based approaches. In those, targeted legitimate website's visual features referred to as signatures are stored in SDB (Signature Database) by the system administrator. They can only detect phishing websites whose signatures are highly similar to SDB's one. Thus, the system administrator has to register multiple signatures to detect various phishing websites and that cost is very high. This incurs the vulnerability of zero-day phishing attack. In order to address this issue, an auto signature update mechanism is needed. The naive way of auto updating SDB is expanding the scope of detection by adding detected phishing website's signature to SDB. However, the previous approaches are not suitable for auto updating since their similarity can be highly different among targeted legitimate website and subspecies of phishing website targeting that legitimate website. Furthermore, the previous signatures can be easily manipulated by attackers. In order to overcome the problems mentioned above, in this paper, we propose a hue signature auto update system for visual similarity-based phishing detection with tolerance to zero-day attack. The phishing websites targeting certain legitimate website tend to use the targeted website's theme color to deceive users. In other words, the users can easily distinguish phishing website if it has highly different hue information from targeted legitimate one (e.g. red colored Facebook is suspicious). Thus, the hue signature has a common feature among the targeted legitimate website and subspecies of phishing websites, and it is difficult for attackers to change it. Based on this notion, we argue that the hue signature fulfills the requirements about auto updating SDB and robustness for attackers' manipulating. This commonness can effectively expand the scope of detection when auto updating is applied to the hue signature. By the computer simulation with a real dataset, we demonstrate that our system achieves high detection performance compared with the previous scheme.
Introduction
Recently, people all over the world use online services such as e-banking, shopping and so on. In this situation, the phishing websites have emerged for attackers to steal personal information (e.g. credit card number, login ID or password) of innocent users [1] . The phishing websites target the famous legitimate websites and mimic their appearance. Thus, unaware Internet users input sensitive information to the phishing websites and the attack succeeds. According to the report of Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), in third quarter of 2018, more than 150 thousand unique phishing websites are found and their threat has continued [2] . The detection of the phishing websites is urgent demand. During an early stage, the phishing detection is based on blacklist-based mechanisms [3] , [4] . However, they can only detect phishing websites whose URL (Uniform Resource Locator) is registered in the blacklist. In order to detect many types of phishing websites, many approaches have been proposed. We introduce representative approaches [5] - [9] . In [5] , Zhang et al. propose Cantina which leverages the fact that phishing websites do not appear in the top of the Google's search result. Cantina extracts keywords of suspicious website and searches them by Google. The keywords are extracted by TF-IDF (Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency) algorithm [10] . However, there are language limitation since TF-IDF does not effectively work in non-English languages. In [6] , Le et al. propose to use the features extracted from URL (Uniform Resource Locator) such as length, domain information and so on. They detect phishing websites by machine learning techniques. However, the machine learning based approaches are weak for feature manipulation by attackers. While those approaches [5] , [6] mainly focus on the internal contents of phishing websites, the visual similarity based approaches [7] - [9] use visual contents as features. The idea behind them is that the visual contents of phishing websites are similar to the targeted legitimate website since they mimic the appearance of the target. Prior to detection, they prepare the legitimate websites' visual features referred to as "signature" and it is stored in SDB (Signature Database). The website whose signature is similar to SDB's one is detected as a phishing website. We focus on the visual similarity based approaches because they can be applied to many kind of legitimate websites and the essence that attackers mimic appearance is immutable in most cases. In [7] , Fu et al. propose to create signatures by focusing on the position of websites' color. However, the phishing website whose appearance is highly similar to the targeted legitimate website is only detected since the signature becomes different one even in the case where the same color's position is changed. In [8] , Zhou et al. propose an extended work of [7] which focuses on the fact that phishing websites tend to have legitimate website's logo. They use the scheme [7] in addition to logo because the harmless websites with targeted website's logo (e.g. advertisement) is detected as a phishing website. However, they have to prepare a lot of signatures of the scheme [7] for better detection performance. In addition to that, since the various types of logo are existed in a legitimate website, it costs very much if the system administrator registers them to SDB for a lot of legitimate websites by hand. In [9] , Mao et al. propose to use the similarity of CSS (Cascading Style Sheet) which defines the design of the websites such as fonts, colors and so on. This is because the phishing websites often plagiarize targeted legitimate website's CSS. However, attackers can create phishing websites without using CSS by embedding a background image of the targeted legitimate website.
Although the schemes mentioned above are the stateof-the-art, they can only detect phishing websites whose signatures are highly similar to SDB's ones which are registered by the system administrator. Thus, he/she has to register multiple signatures in order to achieve high detection performance and that cost is very high. This incurs a zeroday phishing attack which is the situation where a new type of phishing website cannot be detected until the system administrator adds the signature for it. In order to address this issue, an auto signature update mechanism is needed. The naive way of auto updating SDB is expanding the scope of detection by adding detected phishing websites' signature to SDB. However, aforementioned approaches' signatures are not suitable for auto updating since their similarity can be highly different among targeted legitimate website and subspecies of phishing website targeting that legitimate website. This results in the ineffective expansion of the scope of detection even if the auto updating is applied. Furthermore, aforementioned approaches' signatures are weak for attacker's manipulation since they can be changed with a phishing website's atmosphere similar to the targeted legitimate website.
In order to meet the requirements mentioned above, in this paper, we propose a hue signature auto update system for visual similarity-based phishing detection with tolerance to zero-day attack. If a phishing websites has highly different hue information from targeted legitimate one, the users can easily distinguish it (e.g. red colored Facebook is suspicious). This indicates that the hue signature meets the requirement for the prevention of the attacker's manipulating. Simultaneously, the hue information includes the common feature among the targeted legitimate website and subspecies of phishing websites, which meets the requirement for auto updating SDB. This commonness can effectively expand the scope of detection when auto updating is applied to the hue signature. As elements for calculating hue information similarity between two websites, we use website's dominant color ratio and its combination. Since the dominant colors of a website represent its atmosphere, the legitimate website and phishing websites tend to have similar dominant colors. The dominant colors are mainly used for collecting suspicious websites. The color combination is used for relieving a legitimate website which is collected by first one since the irrelevant legitimate websites often have no completely same color combination with phishing web-sites. We evaluate our system by the computer simulation with a real dataset and show high detection performance.
The contribution of our system is as follows:
1. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed hue signature is the first one which can apply automatic updating of SDB in the visual similarity-based approaches. By applying auto updating, our system has tolerance to the zero-day attack. 2. Our system achieves high detection performance although it only uses the website's hue information which are dominant color ratio and color combination.
The rest of this paper is constructed as follows: we describe the system model of the signature-based phishing detection in Sect. 2. We detailedly discuss the shortcomings of aforementioned visual similarity-based approaches in Sect. 3. The proposed system is presented in Sect. 4. Simulation results are shown in Sect. 5. We conclude this paper in Sect. 6. Figure 1 shows the system model of phishing detection. As shown in Fig. 1 , we assume signature based phishing detection. A signature indicates website's feature. The user sends URL of visited website to the detection server when it is suspicious. In the detection server, there are detection scheme and SDB which possesses each targeted website's signature. SDB is maintained by a system administrator. The detection scheme creates a signature from the website sent by the user and searches a similar signature from SDB. If a similar signature is found, the detection scheme sends the user that it is phishing website; otherwise legitimate. The system administrator registers the signatures for detecting phishing websites by hand.
System Model

Problem Formulations
The visual similarity-based approaches can only detect phishing websites whose signatures are highly similar to SDB's ones which are registered by the system administrator. Thus, the system administrator has to register multiple signatures in order to achieve high detection performance. However, since there are generally many types of subspecies which target the same legitimate website, the cost of registering signatures becomes very high if the number of subspecies increases. This incurs a zero-day attack. Generally, the zero-day attack is defined as the situation where an attacker exploits a vulnerability which the administrator or the developer does not notice. In the context of phishing, the zero-day attack is defined as the situation where a new type of phishing website cannot be detected until the system administrator adds the signature for it. A straightforward way to address this issue is to implement an auto signature update mechanism in the system. The naive way of auto updating SDB is expanding the scope of detection by adding detected phishing websites' signature to SDB. However, aforementioned approaches' signatures are not suitable for auto updating since their similarity can be highly different among targeted legitimate website and subspecies of phishing website targeting that legitimate website. In order to prove this, we investigate the similarity among the legitimate website and phishing websites in the scheme [7] . Figure 2 shows the similarity distribution of facebook's legitimate and phishing websites in the scheme [7] . As we can see from Fig. 2 , the similarities of phishing websites are distributed. This is because the scheme [7] uses the positions of colors which can be highly different in each phishing website. In this situation, even if the auto updating is applied, the highly similar signatures are gathered in SDB and the scope of detection cannot effectively be expanded. From these point of view, the requirements of signature based phishing detection system are as follows:
• The system automatically updates SDB for the better detection performance and the zero-day phishing attack. • To automatically update SDB, the signature used for detection has common feature among the targeted legitimate website and subspecies of phishing websites targeting that legitimate website.
In addition to those, we point out that visual similarity-based approaches are weak for attacker's manipulating of features. Fig. 2 The similarity distribution of facebook's legitimate and phishing websites in the scheme [7] For example, although authors in [7] focus on the positions of colors appeared in website's screenshot, it is easy for attackers to create same colored different appearance phishing websites. Moreover, although authors in [9] use CSS similarity between a targeted legitimate website and a phishing website, attackers can create a similar phishing website without using CSS by embedding legitimate website's appearance to the background image. From this point of view, another requirement has to be fulfilled to improve detection performance:
• The signature should not be easily manipulated by attackers who try to avoid detection.
Proposed System
In order to meet the requirements mentioned above, we propose a hue signature auto update system for visual similarity-based phishing detection with tolerance to zeroday attack. The hue information meets the requirement for the prevention of the attacker's manipulating since they tend to use the targeted website's theme color to deceive users. Simultaneously, the hue information includes the common feature among the targeted legitimate website and subspecies of phishing websites, which meets the requirement for auto updating SDB. The proposed system creates a hue signature from websites' dominant color ratio and its combination. In the following subsections, we first prove our hue signature's commonness among legitimate and phishing websites and detailed functionalities are presented. among the targeted legitimate website and subspecies of phishing websites targeting that legitimate website. Thus, we argue that it meets the requirement of auto updating.
Hue Signature's Commonness among Legitimate and Phishing
Flowchart of Our System
As shown in Fig. 4 , the detection procedure of our system consists of five phases, which are "check of domain", "hue signature creation", "check of dominant color ratio", "check of color combination" and "updating SDB". Note that the system administrator stores targeted legitimate website's hue signature(s) to SDB in the initial state. Let w input denote the input website. In the first phase, if w input 's URL contains the same domain information as the targeted website's one, it is judged as legitimate. In the second phase, our system accesses w input 's URL and takes its screenshot. The hue signature S (w input ) is created from that screenshot.
In the third phase, S (w input ) is compared with each hue signature stored in SDB. If there do not exist any similar signatures in SDB, w input is declared as legitimate and the detection procedure is finished; otherwise the next fourth phase is started. In the fourth phase, if S (w input ) has the sufficiently same colors compared with signatures in SDB, w input is declared as a phishing website; otherwise a legitimate website.
In the fifth phase, if w input is judged as a phishing website in the previous phase, our system adds S (w input ) to SDB if it is not completely the same as SDB's one. In the following sections, we detailedly explain each phase.
Check of Domain
In the first phase, our system checks if the w input is the targeted legitimate website itself or not. If this phase does not exist, the targeted legitimate website can be judged as a phishing website in the case where itself is an input. This is realized by comparing the entity name of w input 's domain and that of the targeted legitimate website. For example, consider the case where the system has SDB of facebook and the input website's domain is "www.facebooooook.co.jp". The entity names of them are "facebook" and "facebooooook". In this case, since our system cannot judge if input website is legitimate or not by only using the domain information, the detection process goes to the next phase.
Hue Signature Creation
At the beginning of this phase, our system accesses w input 's URL and takes a screenshot of w input for creating a hue signature. To reduce the computational cost, we resize that screenshot to a 100 × 100 image. Let O denote the matrix of the resized screenshot image. We define the component in the i th row and j th column of O as
where r o i j , g o i j , and b o i j denote o i j 's color value of red, green, and blue. In order to eliminate colors which almost all of websites have, we remove grayscale colors from O. When each element in o i j is converted to the grayscale color, it is converted according to
Suppose P is a grayscale expression of O and we can express the component in the i th row and j th column of P as
Let M denote the matrix whose elements of grayscale are eliminated from O. The component in the i th row and j th column of M is expressed as
where D gray denotes the threshold value of this procedure.
Since there can be too many color patterns in M, we degrade each color to N levels. Let M denote degraded version of M. Each element in M is expressed as
Here, the set of colors included in M is expressed as
where the function "unique" returns non-duplicated set of argument. We define the set of used colors C used as
where c k and |C| are the k-th most occupied color included in M and the number of elements included in C. Suppose n c k denotes the number of c k appeared in M and the hue signature of w input is represented as
where n c k Σ k n c k indicates the ratio of color c k in that signature.
Check of Dominant Color Ratio
In this phase, our system calculates the similarity of S (w input ) and each signature stored in SDB in terms of the dominant color. If at least one signature in SDB is similar to S (w input ), our system goes to the next check of color combination phase. We use EMD (Earth Mover's Distance) [11] as a metric of similarity. EMD indicates the distance between two distributions. In order to calculate EMD, weight vectors and cost matrix of two distributions are needed. In this case, the weight vectors are two signatures' ratio of colors and the cost matrix is euclidean distance of each color pair of two signatures. Here, in order to extract dominant colors from the signature, we limit the number of used color by introducing D color . For example, we suppose that S (w input ) and S (w) stored in SDB are compared. 
, . . . , n dt top Σ t n dt top ), and the component in the k-th row and t-th column of the cost matrix is |c k − d t |/N. If the value of EMD calculated by these values does not exceed the threshold value D EMD , w input is declared as legitimate. Note that EMD values indicates distance between two distributions. In Fig. 3 , the similarity is calculated by normalized EMD.
Check of Color Combination
Our system checks if S (w input ) has the sufficiently same colors of signatures in SDB. If the condition of the color combination is fulfilled, w input is declared as phishing. We leverage Jaccard similarity coefficient [12] which is often used in calculating the similarity of two sets to compare the color combination. With Jaccard similarity, the condition of color combination of two signature (S (w input ) and S (w)) is represented as
where D comb denotes threshold value for the color combination.
Updating Signature Database
Finally, we store S (w input ) to SDB if there do not exist any completely same signature in SDB. Stored signatures are used for the next detection. In this situation, we consider the initial signature should be searched first when detection process is executed. This is because the initial signature is selected by the system administrator and the probability of contributing detection is high. Thus, in order to decide the searching order, we introduce "rank" for each signature stored in SDB. The rank of initial signature is zero and the signature which is similar to the signature whose rank is r has rank r + 1. Note that the similarity in this phase corresponds the color ratio mentioned in Sect. 4.5. Suppose Rank(S (w)) denotes the rank of S (w) stored in SDB and S (w input ) is judged as similar to S (w) in the phase of check of color ratio. The rank of S (w input ) is calculated as
Simulation Results
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our system, we compare our system with the scheme [8] which uses logo detection and is extended work of [7] . This is because that scheme is signature-based phishing detection and uses the information extracted from websites' screenshot. We call that scheme "previous scheme". Following 
where TP, TN, FP, and FN denote the number of True Positive, True Negative, False Positive, and False Negative, respectively. We evaluate our system with these metrics by [15] two scenarios which are the number of initial signatures is one and five. First of all, we have to decide suboptimal threshold value of D EMD and D comb for each of three kinds of websites since the optimal threshold value might be dependent on a dataset and is difficult to be decided. We conduct a grid search when the number of initial signature is one. In this simulation, the suboptimal values of D EMD and D comb are decided when the lowest FPR and the highest TPR are simultaneously achieved. The threshold value of the scheme [7] is similarly decided. Table 1 shows summarization of D EMD and D comb . Other parameters are shown in Table 2 . For all simulations, we use a desktop computer which has Intel Core i7 3.5 GHz processor and 16 GB memory. Among all figures of results, Prop. represents the proposed system and Prev. represents the previous scheme.
Comparison of Signature's Suitability for Auto Update
In order to show the proposed hue signature's suitability for auto update, we implement a naive auto update mechanism to the previous scheme. That is, the websites' signatures which are judged as phishing websites are added to SDB in the previous scheme. In this simulation, we use initial sig-natures which are created from subpages, e.g.,"top page", "login/signup page", "forget password/help page", "security page" and so on, of targeted legitimate websites. In order to show the expansion of the scope of detection, we evaluate true positive rate and false positive rate versus the number of input website. Figure 5 shows true positive rate and false positive rate versus the number of input websites. In these figures, init. indicates the number of initial signatures of each scheme. Moreover, 1 Leg. and 5 Leg. indicate that one and five initial signatures which are created from the targeted legitimate website are used, respectively. As we can see from Fig. 5 (a) , Fig. 5 (b) , and Fig. 5 (c) , both Prop.(init.= 1) and Prop.(init.= 5) can increase true positive rate as the number of input websites increases. This indicates the hue signature is suitable for the auto updating signature. Especially, true positive rate rapidly increases when the number of input website is smaller than 500. This is because similar colored phishing websites are concentrated and the expansion of detection scope is fast. Comparing Prop.(init.= 1) with Prop.(init.= 5), it can be observed that the detection scope of init.= 5 rapidly expands compared with init.= 1 when the number of input websites is small. This is reasonable because, in the initial state, the number of detectable phishing websites slightly increases compared with init.= 1. This can be a merit in terms of detecting zeroday phishing attacks. However, we cannot see significant differences between Prop.(init.= 1) and Prop.(init.= 5) in terms of true positive rate. There are two reasons for this result: (1) in case all of initial signatures are created from subpages of the targeted legitimate website, the ratio of dominant colors is almost the same among those signatures and thus a detection scope of one signature eventually covers that of the others, and in addition to that, (2) in case the system administrator selects a single initial signature, the signature is created from targeted legitimate website's subpage which tends to be especially targeted by attackers and thus effectively contributes to the detection. As a result, the detection scope of multiple initial signatures created from subpages of the targeted legitimate website becomes almost the same as that of single initial signature. Thus, although using many legitimate websites' signatures as initial signatures has a merit in terms of rapid detection scope expansion, it does not significantly improve the detection perfor- On the other hand, as we can see from Fig. 5 (a) and Fig. 5 (b) , the true positive rate does not increase in the previous scheme with auto updating. This is because there are various appearances of phishing websites in facebook and paypal dataset. In other words, the previous scheme which uses the positions of colors cannot effectively expand the scope of detection to cover the various subspecies of phishing website with different positions of colors. Thus, the true positive rate does not increase in spite of using auto update mechanism. However, in Fig. 5 (c) , we can see the auto update mechanism effectively works in the BoA dataset. This is because the BoA dataset includes fewer various appearances of phishing websites. Figure 6 shows an example of the phishing website targeting BoA. Almost all of phishing websites in BoA have BoA's logo and red horizontal bar in the upper side of their screenshot. Although this commonness existed in subspecies of BoA's phishing websites enables auto update in the previous scheme, it might not detect phishing website if the attacker creates a phishing website with highly different color positions. Although it is forecasted that the false positive rate becomes higher with the growth of SDB, the previous scheme achieves low false positive rate. This is because the previous scheme uses logo detection which can effectively reduce false positive rate.
TPR and FPR versus the Number of Input Websites
In order to compare the performance of the proposed system with that of previous scheme without auto updating, we evaluate true positive rate and false positive rate versus the number of input websites in the situation where the number Fig. 8 An example of facebook phishing website of initial signatures is five. In addition to legitimate website's signature, we add four initial signatures created from the phishing websites' screenshot which are not detected in Sect. 5.1. Figure 7 (a), 7 (b), and 7 (c) show true positive rate versus the number of input websites in each dataset. As we can see from Fig. 7 , the basic tendency is similar to the result shown in Fig. 5 . The different point is the true positive rate of the proposed system. By using additional only four phishing signatures, the proposed system brings a great improvement in all dataset. This is because a hue signature's scope of detection is wide and this fact effectively works especially when using multiple initial phishing signatures. In other words, adding initial phishing signatures leads to an effective expansion of the detection scope. Especially, in the facebook dataset, it can be observed that about 30% of improvement compared with Fig. 5 (a) . This is because the types of facebook's phishing websites are various and it is difficult for legitimate signatures to cover all types of them. For example, Fig. 8 shows one of added initial signature and newly detected phishing website. Note that, this added signature is not detected when the initial signatures are created from legitimate website because of its different atmosphere from the legitimate facebook website. By adding this screenshot as an initial signature, our system can detect phishing websites like Fig. 8 (b) . We consider the performance can be improved if more phishing signatures are added in the initial state. With regard to the previous scheme, by the same reason mentioned in Sect. 5.1, the tendency of the true positive rate and the false positive rate are similar to Fig. 5 except for BoA dataset. The performance of the previous scheme in BoA dataset degrades compared with Fig. 5 (c) and the proposed system outperforms it. This result also indicates the previous scheme can only detect phishing websites which are highly similar to the signatures in SDB. Note that the performance can be better if there is a sufficient number of initial signatures. However the cost to realize it is very high. Moreover, since the facebook phishing websites often have no logo of facebook, the true positive rate of the previous scheme is about 0.3, which is especially low.
False Positive and False Negative Analysis
In this section, we analyze the websites resulted in the false positive and false negative. The false positive occurs in each dataset although the false positive rate of our system is small as Fig. 7 shows. There are two types of false positive in each dataset. The first type is the legitimate website which are detected as phishing by initial signatures. The second type is occurred when the scope of detection is over expanded. Unfortunately, it is not easy for our system to completely avoid the second type of false positive, we discuss the first type of false positive. Figure 9 (a), Fig. 9 (c) , and Fig. 9 (e) show the first type of false positive of each website. Since our scheme only uses the dominant color information and its combination, they are classified as phishing. For example, in Fig. 9 (a) , it uses facebook's purple color on the upper side and light green which is used in the button of facebook's legitimate website. In Fig. 9 (e) , the website is judged as a phishing website since it uses completely same red and blue of the legitimate BoA and most of other grayscale colors are ignored in our hue signature. However, it is not a critical problem in the real environment because the system administrator has only to register their domain to the white list. We consider the cost of that action is not high since the false positive rate of our system is small. Figure 9 (b), Fig. 9 (d) and Fig. 9 (f) show false negative of each website. The facebook phishing website shown in Fig. 9 (b) does not use purple but bluish color in the background image. That phishing website's atmosphere is far from legitimate facebook. We can see the logo is hidden by the input area and login button. We consider this is an example way of logo detection avoidance. The paypal phishing website shown in Fig. 9 (d) only uses grayscale colors while the legitimate paypal uses bluish colors. Our system cannot detect this type of phishing website and other detection schemes are needed. The BoA phishing website shown in Fig. 9 (f) uses flash contents. Although in this case the colors of displayed credit card interrupt the detection, we might detect it if more types of phishing website are input. This is because other color factors are similar to the SDB's signature.
Evaluation of Each Phase
In order to show the effectiveness of the check of dominant color ratio and the color combination, we investigate how input websites are judged in each phase. Table 3 shows how input website are judged in each phase. As we can see from this table, almost all of the legitimate websites are correctly judged as legitimate and many phishing websites are judged as similar in terms of dominant color. The legitimate websites suspected by this phase are relieved in the phase of check of color combination in most cases. However, we can see the phase of color combination does not work effectively in Facebook's case. We consider there are two reasons for this. The first reason is that there exist many legitimate websites whose color is similar to facebook. The second reason is that the number of websites which go to the phase of the color combination is small. On the other hand, most of the phishing websites which go to the phase of the color combination are accurately detected as phishing website.
Limitations
Impact of Legitimate Website's Redesign
There are cases where the proposed system cannot detect the phishing website mimicking the renewal design, and it can cause an increase of false negatives (note that the Fig. 10 The example of a legitimate website's redesign in Mailchimp case false positive keeps same degree since the old signatures stored in SDB are not changed by redesign.). For example, Mailchimp, which is one of legitimate web service, has been drastically redesigned in 2018. Figure 10 (a) and Fig. 10 (b) show the redesign of Mailchimp's top page (The old version of website can be obtained from Wayback Machine [16] ). We evaluate EMD value and combination similarity which are leveraged in the proposed system. The EMD value and the combination similarity of these two figures are 0.82 and 0.03, respectively. Both of them indicate that their hue information is highly different from each other. In such cases, the system administrator has to add the signature of Fig. 10 (b) to SDB as another website, otherwise the phishing website mimicking the new design cannot be detected. However, if the change of redesign is small, the proposed system can detect phishing website with the new design. The redesign of BoA in 2019 is a good example of such a situation. Figure 11 (a) and Fig. 11 (b) show the login pages of BoA before and after the redesign, respectively. As we can see from these figures, the used colors are almost the same between them except for the logos on upper left. In order to prove our argument, we conduct a simulation in the situation where five new design subpages of legitimate BoA are in the initial SDB † . Figure 12 shows true positive rate and false positive rate versus the number of input websites in the BoA dataset. As we can see from this figure, the scope of detection effectively expands. This indicates that redesigned phishing websites can be detected by signatures with old design if † Note that, only in this simulation, we use initial signatures created from the redesigned legitimate BoA. In other simulations, we use initial signatures created from BoA with the old design. 
Phishing Website with Manipulated Color
The proposed system is unable to detect a phishing website with drastically different hue information from a legitimate website, without modifying its contents such as layout, component, and messages. Figure 13 shows an example of such a website in facebook case. In this figure, we painted the purple part of facebook red without changing its contents. The EMD value and combination similarity between legitimate facebook and this are 0.795 and 0.19, respectively. This result implies that the proposed system cannot detect the phishing website like this. As mentioned in a review paper [17] , almost all of visual similarity-based phishing detection schemes are based on the fact that phishing websites look very similar in appearance to their corresponding legitimate websites to attract large number of Internet users. From this point of view, while it is difficult for most of visual similarity-based approaches to detect such phishing websites, the possibility that facebook's users are deceived by red colored facebook is low due to its strange looks. Moreover, in this case, other schemes which uses contents of HTML [5] , [18] perform well because the contents are not changed. Since these schemes and the proposed system can be used complementarily, the hybrid approach is suitable for detecting such websites. Figure 14 shows the computational time per detection versus the number of input websites in Facebook dataset. As we can see from Fig. 14, the computational time increases as the number of input websites increases. Since the proposed system stores detected phishing websites' signatures to SDB, it is natural that the computational cost becomes larger. When the number of input websites is small, the computational time of the proposed system is smaller than that of the previous scheme. This is because the previous scheme uses many colors for calculating similarity and uses logo detection scheme. For all signature-based phishing detection scheme, the computational cost becomes larger as the number of signatures stored in SDB increases regardless of applying automatic updating. We consider detecting phishing websites with low computational cost is a challenge for all signature-based phishing detection scheme.
Computational Cost
Conclusion
We have proposed a hue signature auto update system for visual similarity-based phishing detection with tolerance to zero-day attack. Our proposal is the hue signature which is suitable for auto updating of signature database in phishing detection. By applying auto updating to our hue signature, our system can have tolerance to zero-day phishing attack while reducing human cost. By the computer simulation with real dataset, we show our system achieves high detection performance compared with the previous scheme.
